The Saudi-led coalition stated that it had attacked Houthi military targets in Hodeidah Governorate. Reports identified locations around the port city of Hodeidah and on Kamaran Island. Saudi Arabia justified the strikes by citing the threat to commercial shipping.

This represents a qualitative escalation compared with previous days. Saudi Arabia is no longer responding solely through protective measures and threats, but is intervening militarily in Yemen. This increases the risk of a renewed open war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis.

The security environment around Hodeidah, Kamaran, and the southern entrance to the Red Sea is deteriorating. Vessels must prepare for additional military exclusion zones, navigation warnings, airstrikes, and short-notice route changes.

On July 25, the Houthis stated that they had carried out a missile attack against the southern Saudi city of Jizan. The attack was presented as retaliation for the Saudi airstrikes on Hodeidah and Kamaran. Independent confirmation of the specific impact was not initially available.

The escalation is no longer confined to commercial vessels and the Bab al-Mandab. Saudi territory is once again being identified as a target for retaliation. Jizan is particularly relevant because of its proximity to Yemen, its port function, and its regional energy and industrial infrastructure.

Companies operating in southwestern Saudi Arabia must prepare for increased air-defence activity, short-notice aviation and port disruptions, and heightened risks to personnel, logistics, and regional supply chains.

The Danish-flagged product tanker Torm Innovation, carrying approximately 500,000 barrels of naphtha from Yanbu to Japan, changed course. Instead of transiting the southern Bab al-Mandab, the vessel is travelling through the Suez Canal and then around the Cape of Good Hope to Asia.

The Houthi threat is now demonstrably changing real transport decisions. Although the corridor remains geographically open, it is no longer operationally acceptable for certain shipping companies and cargoes. The alternative route may extend the voyage by up to approximately 30 days.

Longer rotations tie up tanker capacity, increase bunker-fuel and personnel costs, and delay supplies to Asian refineries and chemical companies. Naphtha, fuels, petrochemicals, and time-sensitive industrial feedstocks are particularly exposed.

The US military confirmed that it had fired on and disabled another commercial vessel after the ship allegedly ignored repeated warnings and attempted to breach the blockade of Iranian ports. At the same time, the International Maritime Organization reported that approximately 6,000 seafarers aboard around 400 vessels were stranded in the vicinity of Hormuz.

US enforcement of the blockade creates a second form of operational access control in addition to the Iranian attack risk. Commercial vessels must now consider not only Iranian permissions, mine risks, and missile threats, but also possible US interdiction.

Vessels and cargoes may remain tied up for extended periods. Crew changes, port calls, charter contracts, and delivery schedules are becoming more difficult to plan. Effective transport capacity is declining even without a complete geographical closure of the strait.

Prices for physical crude-oil cargoes from the Middle East, Europe, and Africa rose to two-month highs. Some grades available for prompt delivery approached USD 110 per barrel. Buyers increasingly sought immediately available alternatives outside the disrupted supply corridors.

Price pressure is shifting from futures markets to physical cargoes that can actually be delivered. This is a stronger indication of genuine supply scarcity than a temporary movement in Brent or WTI futures.

Refineries and energy buyers must accept higher procurement prices and quality premiums. This creates rising costs for diesel, aviation fuel, chemicals, plastics, fertilisers, transport, and industrial production.