Iran war and oil price shock: who wins and who really loses?

Strategic Risk Intelligence Letter from Global Insight Group.
This analysis is based on the developed by Michaela Schaaf-Hoffelner GFDD Framework™ and was created for executives.

GFDD Framework™ and GFDD Diagnostics™ are methodical analysis concepts by Michaela Schaaf-Hoffelner. © 2026. All rights reserved.

For: Management
Date: 2026-05-07
time horizon
Strategic context: now → 12 – 30 months
Structural context: now → 5-10 years

What politics, markets and media are currently telling

As of May 7, 2026, the most important strategic observation is not who militarily asserts the upper hand, but who has replacement routes, storage buffers, fiscal firepower and price-transfer power. Since the start of the war on February 28th and the formal ceasefire of April 8th, the situation around the Strait of Hormus has remained unstable. The United Arab Emirates sent schools and colleges back to distance learning from May 5th to 8th, including The National News and Gulf News report; At the same time, Donald Trump temporarily paused the US mission ‘Project Freedom’ to open the strait on May 5, although the blockade will formally remain in force. NBC News reported on the temporary suspension of the mission. At the same time, Iran is examining a US peace bill that has just not completely cleared up key points of contention such as the Iranian nuclear program and the permanent opening of the strait. both BBC as well as Al Jazeera continue to report significant differences between Washington and Tehran. The market therefore continues to react extremely volatile: After a deal-driven crash to around 98 dollars, Brent quoted again at around 101.8 dollars per barrel on May 7th; At the end of April, Oil was still at 124 dollars at times, and the International Energy Agency described the shock as the most serious supply disruption in oil history.

Where the shock actually arises

The core of the problem is physical and logistical. In 2025, almost 20 million barrels of oil per day ran through the Strait of Hormus; Only 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day can be diverted via alternative export routes. So the region is not systemically important because of headlines, but because it remains a bottleneck for which there is still no full replacement. The IEA states that global oil supply collapsed by 10.1 million barrels per day in March alone. Reuters also reports that the pressure on offer could intensify even in the event of a conflict end because global stocks have already melted away. At the same time, stocks were massively mined outside of the Gulf, while in the Golf due to a lack of drains, more floating warehousing arose again. The coordinated release of 400 million barrels from strategic reserves buys time, but does not replace normal physical flows.

From this follows the actual dividing line of this shock: not east against west, but optionality against dependency. If you have your own production, large reserves, alternative pipelines or robust supply relationships, you will get through the crisis relatively better. Anyone who is dependent on cheap, steady and safe sea transport will lose. This is exactly why the winners and losers are not congruent with the military fronts.

Who wins relatively and why

The US is not a clean macroeconomic winner, but the clearest relative winner in the energy sector is among the major economies. The U.S. Energy Information Administration puts US crude oil production at a record of 13.6 million barrels per day for 2025. At the same time, Reuters recently reported record values for US distillate exports, and US stocks were largely driven by foreign demand. For producers, midstream companies and exporters, this is a gain in margin and geopolitical leverage. But the downside is real: even the US Federal Reserve now says that the war is becoming more and more like an inflationary shock from an economic point of view. In other words: America Inc. wins more than the American consumer.

The United Arab Emirates are the most strategically interesting special case. Abu Dhabi left OPEC and OPEC+ on May 1st and openly justifies this with the aim of producing what the world market needs, without any quota restrictions. Forbes describes this step as a strategic repositioning of a state whose state assets now exceed pure crude oil dependency. Reuters also reports that Abu Dhabi’s state oil sector is targeting 5 million barrels of daily production capacity by 2027. What matters is not only politics, but the infrastructure: In addition to Saudi Arabia, only the Emirates have a relevant crude oil pipeline that Hormus can bypass. The IEA puts the current capacity of the line to Fujairah at just under 1.8 million barrels per day. This is exactly why Fujairah and Khor Fakkan have become the decisive trading lifelines in the Gulf in recent weeks. Reuters Describes both ports as fragile key veins of regional energy and trade architecture. Nevertheless, it would be too rough to label the UAE as the ‘big winner of the war’: According to Reuters, the funding fell back to just under 1.9 million barrels per day in March, the east coast infrastructure was attacked, the airspace was temporarily restricted and distance learning nationwide reactivated. The correct verdict is therefore: relative winners among the Gulf States, but by no means sure winners.

China is better buffered than almost any other major importer, but here too, ‘winner’ is only half right. Reuters reports that China’s independent refineries continue to buy Iranian oil despite US pressure; In March, purchases were at a record level of 1.8 million barrels per day, even though demand has recently decreased due to weak refinery margins. The buffer is even more important: the EIA estimates China’s strategic oil stocks at almost 1.4 billion barrels at the end of 2025. This gives Beijing time and flexibility. At the same time, Analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Brookings Institution show that while China is gaining geopolitical and diplomatic opportunities, it also shows energy volatility, supply chain risks and weaker global demand for Chinese exports suffers. The more precise diagnosis is therefore: China is not the winner of the crisis, but the best buffered large Asian player.

Outside of the Gulf, alternative exporting countries in particular benefit. In Russia, the oil price shock is already sufficient for Moscow to be able to buy foreign exchange for the National Wealth Fund again. Reuters reports that the war will give Russia additional currency inflows again despite sanctions; At the same time, the windfall is smaller than many had expected because discounts, sanctions and Ukrainian attacks on infrastructure limit the advantage. In Norway, on the other hand, demand from Asia is visibly increasing; The country reports higher product and LNG demand and the highest quarterly profits from a major Nordic energy provider in three years. Here, too, the following applies: The winners are those who do not depend on the golf, but can deliver in its gap.

Who loses real and why

From an economic point of view, the biggest loser remains Iran itself. Reuters describes the country as ‘battered and isolated’: jobs were lost, prices rose, factories, power plants, airports, bridges and rail connections were damaged, and without Financing of ongoing government obligations is difficult even to facilitate sanctions. Estimates that Reuters quotes assume that energy-related repair costs in the region alone could rise to up to $58 billion. It is therefore not to be confused with economic strength that Tehran can exert pressure on the world market via the strait. It is negotiating power from the position of structural weakness.

The European Union is the central macroeconomic loser outside the immediate war zone. Only around 4 percent of the crude oil flows through Hormus go directly to Europe; The actual vulnerability runs here via the price channel, the industry and the financing costs. Reuters reports that Europe’s gas prices have risen by about a third since the beginning of the war. Eurozone inflation jumped to 3.0 percent in April, mainly due to energy. The Commission is already warning internally about possible demand rationing, jet fuel bottlenecks and problems refilling the gas storage facilities if the shock persists. Added to this is a second blow from trade policy: the US threat to raise EU car tariffs from 15 to 25 percent has charged another uncertainty block to the already ailing industrial sector. Reuters reports that the negotiations between Brussels and Washington are coming under additional pressure. Al Jazeera reports that European premium manufacturers in particular would be massively affected; A German institute estimates a potential production loss of almost 18 billion dollars for Germany alone. So Europe’s problem is not primarily physical defects, but expensive energy plus weaker industry plus intensified transatlantic risks.

The rest of the Asian import block – especially India, Japan and South Korea – pays the highest real-world price. The IEA shows that China and India together took in 44 percent of Hormuz crude oil exports, while Japan and Korea were particularly dependent on this corridor. The International Monetary Fund explicitly calls Asia the most exposed region: oil and gas correspond to about 4 percent of GDP there, almost twice as much as in Europe, and a long-lasting shock could be cumulatively cumulative by 1 to 2 by 2027 Press percentage points. South China Morning Post also refers to the exceptionally high energy dependency of many Asian economies. Reuters recently reported that Asia’s oil imports collapsed by 30 percent in April; Refineries fighting with a shortage of raw materials, jet fuel and diesel prices in Singapore have risen massively, and even governments with subsidies or tax relief can only temporarily dampen this pressure. China is therefore rather the exception within Asia – not the pattern.

The clear sector losers include global shipping, airlines and energy-intensive industries. Reuters reports war risk premiums, some of which have increased by more than 1000 percent; On individual trips, the additional premium jumped from 0.25 to up to 3 percent of the ship’s value. Shipping companies redirect ships around the Cape of Good Hope, which costs time and fuel. At the same time, the US Department of Transport reported loudly Reuters for March a 56 percent jump in fuel costs for large US airlines; In Europe, a large network airline already puts the additional jet-fuel cost block in 2026 at 1.7 billion euros. In industry, the same mechanism becomes visible: the mood in German chemistry has fallen at its lowest level in almost three years due to supply chain disruptions and higher input costs. These industries are most directly bearing the price of the war because they do not skim off geopolitical pensions, but only pay for more expensive energy and more expensive logistics.

Strait of Hormuz

What global power shifts become visible

Below the visible war dynamics, there may be a much lower system shift. The conflict over Iran, Hormus and the Middle East is increasingly acting like an accelerator of already ongoing fragmentation processes within the global order.

The focus is less on the question of whether the US dollar will lose its dominance in the short term and whether the world will gradually break into several parallel powers, trade and financial areas. It is precisely this development that is now being intensively discussed by think tanks, central banks and macro analysts. BRICS states are building alternative payment structures, central banks are increasingly buying physical gold, bilateral trade agreements are partially bypassing the dollar, China is expanding Yuan trading areas, and raw material and supply chains are increasingly being geopolitized. Energy is once again developing into a strategic instrument of power.

Hormus – not just oil

The conflict in the Middle East is therefore not to be considered in isolation. Hormus connects several global areas of tension at the same time: the petrodollar system, the strategic competition between China and the USA, increasing cooperation within the BRICS countries, global energy dependencies, maritime trade routes and control over critical raw materials and alternative power blocks.

The increasing concentration of geopolitical interests around China, Russia, Iran, India and the Gulf region is particularly striking. Many of these states have enormous resources, production or population resources, but historically they were heavily involved in Western-dominated financial, trade and security structures.

This is exactly where a new dynamic seems to be building up: not the sudden collapse of the previous order, but a slow fragmentation of global centers of power.

Against this background, several US decisions seem strategically less random than they appear at first glance. The tightened customs policy, the growing pressure on European allies, the focus on critical raw materials, the increased interest in Greenland and the Arctic, and the power projection in the Middle East and the strategic competition with China in the Indo-Pacific together result in a significantly greater geopolitical image.

Plausible scenario analysis

A plausible scenario analysis could therefore be that the USA may no longer primarily try to expand its global dominance, but increasingly to slow down the relative loss of systemic control and actively manage the transition to a multipolar order.

At the same time, another contradiction arises. While Washington is trying to stabilize its strategic position, other analysts argue that aggressive tariffs, geopolitical uncertainty, pressure on allies and increasing fragmentation could even accelerate de-dollation over the long term.

It is precisely this ambiguity that is crucial. GFDD Diagnostics™ Therefore, do not analyze the question of ‘who is right’, but which structural shifts in power due to conflicts, energy crises, raw material politics and geopolitical fragmentation actually arise.

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Which scenarios would move the ranking now

Scenario A – High probability (approx. 55-65%)

Fragile ceasefire and controlled instability

In the likely-looking base scenario, a fragile ceasefire with periodic attacks, political de-escalation rhetoric and persistently disturbed physical rivers remains. This is exactly what the current signals speak for: Washington pauses the opening mission, but is formally maintaining the blockage; Tehran examines suggestions, but at the same time calls them an American wish list; Ships continue to be attacked and the Emirates live under tightened security precautions.

For the market, this would mean high volatility, but not a rapid relapse to pre-war level. In this world, producers with flexibility remain relatively at an advantage, while importing countries and transport-intensive sectors continue to lose.

Scenario B – Mean probability (approx. 25-35%)

Partial and step-by-step relaxation

In the more favorable scenario, there will be a viable memorandum between the USA and Iran in the next few weeks, which will end the war phase and prepare the opening of the Strait of Hormus. Then financial markets would relax very quickly, as the recent oil price drop on a deal hope has already shown.

However, this does not mean that the physical crisis ends immediately. Reuters and IEA both point out that re-commissioning, repairs, ship flows and stock reconstruction are likely to take months.

In this scenario, today’s relative winners such as US export sectors, Russia or alternative supplier countries lose windfall power, while airlines, industry and importing countries would benefit first.

Scenario C – low probability (approx. 10-15%)

Escalation with a high strategic impact

In the escalation scenario – i.e. new massive attacks on ports, tankers or energy systems – the current winner-loser list would be even sharper. The IEA has already shown how quickly the shock has developed into a historical supply disorder, and AP News Reported fire again on May 4th in the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone, ship attacks and an oil price jump.

Then Asia, Europe, airlines, chemicals and logistics in particular would come under additional pressure. Even supposed winners like the UAE would then slip more into the loss zone because their bypass infrastructure and east coast ports are also directly exposed.

Strategically, this scenario would be particularly relevant because it could accelerate not only energy prices but also supply chains, inflation, insurance risks, global financial markets and geopolitical fragmentation.

Judgment for decision-makers – Strategic Implications

The sober answer to the title question is: There are no pure winners, but there are clear relative winners and unambiguous losers. Relative winners today are primarily players with their own production, extraordinary stocks or alternative export routes – the US energy sector, the UAE in a weakened form, China as a better buffered importer and selected non-golf exporters. The clear losers are Iran itself, import-dependent economies in Asia, Europe’s industrial complex as well as shipping, airlines and energy-intensive industries. However, the most strategically important conclusion is: Falling Futures are not the same as normalization. As long as stocks are melting, systems are damaged and Hormus remains politically open, but only physically usable, the crisis is not over – even if the next diplomatic breakthrough on the screen looks friendly.

What most people overlook

The real core of the current dynamic may not be the question of who wins militarily, but in the fact that controlled instability has become strategically or economically useful for several actors at the same time. This is exactly where a situation arises in which many sides officially communicate de-escalation, while structural incentives for complete stabilization remain weak.

Original GFDD Analysis by Michaela Schaaf-Hoffelner / Global Insight Group.

Frequently Asked Questions about Iran War and Oil Price Shock

Is the road of Hormus open again?

Not in the normal sense. There have been individual transits and clear hopes on the markets in the last few days, but Washington has only paused ‘Project Freedom’, and Reuters describes the peace bill itself as thin and incomplete in central points. The sea route is therefore politically in negotiation, but not yet physically and legally normalized.

Who benefits the most from high oil prices?

Producers and exporters with free or expandable capacity are currently benefiting the most, i.e. the US energy sector in particular and the UAE in a more limited form and alternative supplier countries outside of the Gulf. But even there, what looks like a profit at the company level can become inflationary and politically problematic at the economic level.

Is Europe more affected than the USA?

Yes, but above all different. The USA is benefiting more from production and exports, but at the same time suffers from higher prices and inflation risks. Although Europe obtains far fewer molecules directly through Hormus than Asia, it is hit by higher gas and oil prices, industrial pollution, interest rate pressure and now also through new US car tariff risks.

Is China winner or just better buffered?

Rather better buffered. China continues to have access to Iranian barrels, has enormous strategic and commercial warehouses and is able to cushion the shock better than Japan, Korea or India. But think-tank analyzes and market data also show that weaker export demand, energy volatility and supply chain risks are also affecting China.

Do the oil prices fall permanently after a deal?

Financially probably fast, physically not. Markets are rapidly encouraging political relaxation, but inventory reductions, infrastructure repairs, bottlenecks in products such as Jet Fuel and the gradual resumption of normal tanker movements suggest real market relaxation would be significantly slower than the first price slip on the futures markets.

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Author of Global Insight Group Intelligence:

Michaela Schaaf-Hoffelner has over 35 years of experience in strategic and technical project and product management – especially in the areas of IT, control technology and intralogistics. Through her many years of work on complex systems, she recognizes structural risks and breaks in the dynamic fitthat are often overlooked in classical analyses.

Your focus is on Causal connections and systemic dependencies to make them visible and in concrete Strategic Benefits to translate for investors and decision-makers. Their analyzes combine deep technical understanding of the system with geopolitical and economic developments.